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Abstract
Enterprises and individual users heavily rely on the abilities of antiviruses and
other security mechanisms. However, the methodologies used by such software
are not enough to detect and prevent most of the malicious activities and also
consume a huge amount of resources of the host machine for their regular oper-
ations. In this paper, we propose a combination of machine learning techniques
applied on a rich set of features extracted from a large dataset of benign and
malicious les through a bespoke feature extraction tool. We extracted a rich
set of features from each le and applied support vector machine, decision tree,
and boosting on decision tree to get the highest possible detection rate. We also
introduce a cloud-based scalable architecture hosted on Amazon web services to
cater the needs of detection methodology. We tested our methodology against
dierent scenarios and generated high achieving results with lowest energy con-
sumption of the host machine.
Keywords: Malware Analysis, Machine Learning, Cloud, Decision Tree,
Boosting, SVM, Security
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1. Introduction
A recent report from Intel Security claims that they detect more than 7000
malware attacks every hour and this is only for mobile devices [1]. The number
is signicantly bigger if the domain is broader, such as; individual computers,
enterprise networks, websites, and other web enabled devices and infrastruc-
tures. Figure 1 presents the statistics, published by AV-TEST, of malware
released every year, AV-TEST institute registers near to 400,000 new malware
every day [2]. Out of millions of malwares collected each year, majority of the
samples are the evolved version of their predecessor, which happens because of
an extremely intelligent yet malicious approach taken by the malware authors.
When a malware author decides to release the code in public, many of them
are released with a mutation engine for their [3]. This not only allows other
people with malicious intent to generate their version of that malware, it also
doesnt require a lot of programming knowledge for doing so. Even if only the
original code is released by the malware author, it becomes easy for anyone to
manipulate the code or add some more malicious features to use the malware
for their own gain. This gives an enormous edge to the black-hat community
over the white-hat community by saving time and recreating a sophisticated
and more lethal version of an old malware. Malware authors use obfuscation
and replication techniques to change the apparent features of malware dynam-
ically to avoid getting detected by antiviruses and even if a single instance of
a malware is detected, multiple, yet completely dierent, instances of the same
malware are generated making it nearly impossible for the security software to
detect it [4, 5].
The number of malware released every year is enormously more than previous
years [6] and it is practically impossible to separately analyze the features and
behavior of every malware released in the wild. Although, antiviruses claim
to protect the individual systems, enterprise networks, emails, and other types
of web-forgery, their progress is not as impressive as claimed by their vendors.
Antiviruses not only fail to protect against modern sophisticated attacks, as
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Figure 1: Malware Release Stats per Year by AVTEST [2]
proved by many researchers, they also consume a lot of resources for trying to
do so. However, antiviruses and their detection strategy cannot be classied
as useless, the techniques and methodologies used by antiviruses to detect and
prevent malware from attacking and propagating are quite useful for malware
that are known and whose signature and heuristics are present in antiviruss
database [7]. Although, only relying on antiviruses is a huge mistake, as they
consume a lot of resources and cannot completely secure the targeted machine
or network. Therefore, many security companies and researchers have proposed
and implemented alternatives for malware detection that deliver promising re-
sults.
Detecting a malware and preventing its infection or further propagation in a
local network or in the wild requires an understanding of the techniques that
are used by its authors, which includes a comprehensive understanding of all
the apparent features of malicious les along with how they behave in a system
or in a networked environment. The static and dynamic analysis of malware
produce apparent and behavioral features of malicious les respectively, which
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allows the malware analysts and security experts to understand the dynamics
of dierent types of vulnerabilities and the malware which exploit those vulner-
abilities. Both these analysis techniques are useful in dierent scenarios but if
the sole purpose is to reduce the time consumed during detection along with
the resources consumption for doing so, then static analysis is a better choice.
Analyzing a le statically doesnt guarantee that it is going to be perfectly iden-
tied as malicious or safe, it depends on the comprehensiveness of the analysis
along with the relevance of the parameters that are considered to classify the
le as safe or malicious. Moreover, for the system to understand whether the le
is safe or malicious, it has to rst learn about the apparent features of both the
types. Therefore, it is important to apply existing and relevant machine learn-
ing algorithms to train the system. It will not only enhance systems awareness
about malicious and legitimate les, it will reduce the time and resources con-
sumed while detecting the malware.
This paper is an extension of an existing work published in [10], which mainly
focused on two very important objectives; a) higher detection rate, b) low re-
source consumption. Higher detection rate [10] was achieved by combining the
detection mechanism of ten antiviruses with a comprehensive open source static
analysis tool, which gave a thorough output quite rapidly. Resource consump-
tion was reduced by setting up the entire detection engine on a cloud-based
server. The results from the above-mentioned approach were promising and
achieved what was proposed initially.
The system developed and implemented in [10] was part of a pilot study,
which had a primary objective of proving the hypothesis that a system can
be developed that can consume very limited resources of the host machine to
detect around 98% of the malicious les. Figure 2 presents the comparison of
detection ratio between initial study [10] and major antiviruses. Although, the
result does support the initial hypothesis but system does need a more resilient
back end architecture supported and trained by some veried machine learning
algorithms.
Understanding malware; their behavior, motives, and origins, is an innite
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Figure 2: Detection Ratio of Initial Study [10]
paradigm and it is practically impossible to do that even by investing a massive
amount of resources in the eld. The recent news about an old attack [11] is a
proof that the size of an organization is directly proportional to the level of de-
struction a cyberattack can cause. The attack on Yahoo, which they claim was
initiated in 2013 and still not completely rectied [11], shows the intensity of a
sophisticated attack on a large organization. Several security experts, using dif-
ferent manual detection techniques, to protect an organization, can be bypassed
by a sophisticated attack. Whereas, an automated system simultaneously using
multiple techniques, which includes; conventional detection, thorough analysis,
and machine learning, can surely enhance the level of security for that organi-
zation and at the same time enhance its own performance with every iteration.
However, such approach can only be successful if it is not burdening the enter-
prise infrastructure by consuming a lot of resources to make the system secure
and resilient against malware attacks [12].
Large enterprise networks and even individual computers generate a large amount
of network and process logs, which are analyzed by security analysts and ad-
ministrators to detect any malicious behavior. These logs and similar data if
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analyzed properly can protect the system against many, if not every, type of
attacks. Many researchers and corporate sector entities are incorporating ma-
chine learning for malware detection and to predict any future attacks. Machine
learning can signicantly enhance the detection mechanism by accurately de-
tecting known attacks along with predicting any previously unknown malicious
activity with very high true positive rate. CloudIntell, incorporates an opti-
mum combination of machine learning algorithms that can eciently detect a
malicious activity without consuming a lot of resources of the client machine or
network it is suppose to monitor.
Several dierent domains are beneting from the scalable features of cloud plat-
forms by utilizing services, infrastructures, platform applications, etc. oered
by the cloud service providers. Migrating to the cloud or using cloud services al-
low businesses or applications to scale their scope or simply reduce their overall
costs. CloudIntell uses several infrastructural services oered by AWS (Amazon
Web Services) to enhance the energy eciency initially proposed in the pilot
study [10]. The pilot study [10] did utilize the cloud platform for energy ef-
ciency but this extended version is designed to thoroughly utilize the cloud
infrastructure. This will not only enhance the persistence in energy eciency
of the entire system, it will also help the analysis and detection mechanisms by
scaling the system to take many requests simultaneously.
CloudIntell is more appealing and close to industrial implementation as com-
pared to many similar approaches for the following reasons:
 Although, dynamic analysis has the ability to retrieve a huge amount of
behavioral characteristics from a malicious le but the implications of this
type of analysis include higher resource consumption along with analysts
involvement in the process. The comprehensiveness and automation in
static analysis techniques can generate a set of features that can be used
to identify a malware with much lesser resources.
 Enterprise environment requires a system that is proactive and can detect
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any sophisticated attack before it can penetrate the network. Having
machine learning techniques that could learn from the analysis of a huge
number of malware can predict the behavior of a le without an in-depth
analysis, consuming time and other resources.
 The entire architecture of this system is based on the idea of scalability.
The utilization of the cloud platform not only serves as an idea of con-
suming less energy of the client machine it is monitoring, it also allows
the system to be extended and used by dierent enterprises. As the sys-
tem is based on a client server architecture, The client module works as
a lightweight agent on the host machine and it is powered by the server
module. This allows the client module to benet from the rich server
without consuming host machines CPU or networks resources.
 The comprehensive mechanism of classifying a le as malicious or safe,
veries the authenticity of the system along with the generation of detailed
analysis reports, which can be used for real-time detection and prevention
of known and unknown threats.
 Not many systems with such features generate output which can further be
used for the enhancement of other systems. The analysis report generation
in an appropriate and easy to understand manner could facilitate the
sharing of threat intelligence data on a larger scale.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; section 2 presents the related work
done in the same area, section 3 presents the in-depth discussion of the archi-
tecture of the entire system and how it is implemented, section 4 presents the
details of data collection for the experiments, section 5 presents the methodology
used to enhance the detection of malware and reduce the resource consumption,
along with the machine learning algorithms used, section 6 presents the mal-
ware detection experiments and their results, section 7 presents the discussion
on the results achieved through experiments, and section 8 concludes the work
discusses the possible future directions.
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2. Related Work
Using machine learning for the identication of malware has been proposed
using several dierent techniques by many researchers [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Each
of these studies have their own methodologies to approach the problem of mal-
ware identication, by increasing the true positive, and reducing the false pos-
itive rate. Majority of the research in malware detection is based on windows-
based malware and only focus on the detection of one type of malicious code.
However, more than 90% of the industrial environment is based on windows,
therefore, the threat of windows-based malware is signicantly higher.
The conventional techniques of malware detection, also known as signature-
based detection used by antiviruses are still quite useful and it can awlessly
detect a known malware. These techniques are not very helpful when there is
an attack from a new or unknown malware, which is why there is a huge gap in
the industry, despite several studies in this area.
One of the most relevant studies in this area were conducted by Kolter and
Maloof (hereon KM) [13]. They drew techniques from machine learning and
data mining and applied them on their collection. In their study [18], they
used a common text classication practice, n-grams, which tested the results
of various classiers on malware detection. The techniques included in their
research were; SVM, decision trees, Nave Bayes, and then applying boosting on
each of the techniques. The KM approach used the AUC (Area under Curve)
of an ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) to evaluate the performance of
their classier. They tested based on the highest information gains n-grams,
computed with the help of the following equation:
IG(j) =
X
vj2f0;1g
X
Ci
P (vj ; Ci)log
P (vj ; Ci)
P (vj)P (Ci)
(1)
They treated the presence or absence of the specied n-gram as Boolean on
their classier for boosted decision tree. As per their results, their model of
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boosted decision tree was able accomplish the nest accuracy rate out of all,
achieving a 95% condence interval AUC i.e. 0:9958 0:0024. Boosting signif-
icantly enhances the performance of weak or unstable classiers by decreasing
their variance and bias but it can aect inversely on the stable classiers [24],
KM approach claims to improve the stable classiers through boosting as well.
The samples both benign and malicious used by them comprised of 1971 be-
nign les and 1651 malicious les. The benign executables were retrieved from
Windows OS (XP, 2000), and other online resources. Whereas, the malicious
collection was obtained from MITRE Corporation and VX Heavens online repos-
itory. The KM research also used their approach of static heuristics technique
for identifying payload functionality of malware. It identies the functionality
without dynamically analyzing malware, which is an ecient way because it
doesnt utilize resources required for sandboxing and eliminates the threats in-
volved in dynamic analysis. They were able to identify payload functionality
with the help of reverse engineering analysis reports of a subset of their complete
collection. The KM approach showed promising results in two dierent direc-
tions; malware detection and payload identication. However, there are some
weaknesses in this approach, considering the small sample size, missing 6 out of
291 malicious les is a real game changer in real life detection. This means if
the dataset is bigger, it can signicantly increase the number of malicious les
missed in a scan, which should be the main concern while detecting malware.
Moreover, KM approach is not very eective for obfuscated malware and can
easily omit such malicious les during the detection process.
MaTR [14] approach is another noteworthy contribution in this domain in which
they recreated the experimental environment of KM using same dataset and the
same formula presented in equation 1 to highlight their weaknesses. MaTR ap-
proach used 31193 malicious and 25195 clean les in the initial experiment and
compared their results with KM approach, which showed improvements over
KM with the following mean and condence intervals.
The MaTR approach outperforms the KM approach and prove it by recreating
9
Figure 3: ROC Curves for KM n-gram Retest and MaTR [14]
the KM experiments, as presented in gure 3. MaTR system design introduces
an interesting approach by adding a human component in its system as illus-
trated in gure 4. The reason behind introducing a human component is to
give the system a capability of real-time detection. This means that with the
help of a human operator continuously monitoring the system logs, decisions on
legitimacy of the les can be made by looking at live anomalies occurring in the
network. The human operator in this case provides appropriate responses for
the type of malware rather than an automated and xed response for all type
of malware.
For the classication of malware, MaTR approach uses bagged decision tree
classiers, which can enhance the performance of simple decision tree and make
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Method Mean 95%CI
MaTR 0.999914 0.999840-0.999987
KM Retest 0.999173 0.998926-0.999421
KM Original 0.9958 0.9934-0.9982
Table 1: Mean AUC and Condence Interval [14]
Figure 4: MaTR System Flow Diagram [14]
the results more accurate. The MaTR approach heavily relies on the human
operator to take decision based on the detection results, which can be its main
weakness. In the live environment, when a malware attacks a system or an
enterprise network an automated response is necessary because when it comes
to malware detection time is a key component. A malware can propagate and
replicate itself within minutes inside a network or in a single machine, which
means that an automated response is necessary. In MaTR approach, the pa-
rameter of response time and its aects are not mentioned. Additionally, the
classication methodology of MaTR claims a very high detection rate, however,
the performance on obfuscated malware is not present and it lacks the ability
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to do so.
3. System Architecture
One of the contribution of this paper is the energy eciency, which is one of
the weakest areas of many antiviruses. When it comes to higher performance
versus energy eciency, there is always a tradeo but the most important thing
is how the impact of that tradeo can be minimized. The architecture proposed
and implemented in this paper hosts the modules running the malware detec-
tion algorithms, which are discussed in the later sections. Any security system,
which claims to identify a malware and protect the system in real-time with
sophisticated techniques will require a lot of resources for doing so and ends up
making the system more vulnerable than making it resilient. The algorithms
and techniques that are proposed, implemented, and assessed in the later sec-
tions have the main objective to detect malware by a set of dierent techniques.
To avoid burdening the host machines, which require protection against mal-
ware attacks, majority of the system is hosted on Amazons cloud platform.
The architecture present in gure 5, illustrate that when a client sends a re-
quest, it is sent to a queue, which is pulled by the detection engine to perform
the analysis and the response is then sent by the detection engine to the client
through the queue as well. To make decisions that whether a le is clean or
malicious and that too accurately and instantly, the detection engine requires
constant and rigorous training. The algorithms used to build this detection
engine, discussed in the later section, are trained continuously by analyzing a
large amount of clean and malicious les to understand the dierence between
the both. These les are stored in malware repository, which is hosted on Ama-
zon Elastic File System (EFS) which makes it easier to manage and update
remotely. The reports generated after the analysis are also stored in the same
environment. Hosting the entire system on dierent modules of AWS not only
makes it more scalable, it is extremely reliable and ecient.
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Figure 5: CloudIntell System Architecture
The architecture illustrates ve main modules in the overall system, four out
of them are hosted on the cloud. It can support multiple individual clients and
many enterprise networks concurrently. The experiments performed in this re-
search used single request and response queues and only one detection engine
because of low number of requests. However, the architecture is designed and
implemented in a way that it can dynamically enhance itself based on the higher
number of requests or higher number of clients. This means that the same ar-
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chitecture can cater the security needs of a distributed enterprise network or
multiple enterprise networks.
3.1. Queues
Figure 5 illustrate the functionality of both request and response queues in
the overall architecture, both queues are responsive in nature and based on the
number and frequency of requests from the client module. These queues are de-
veloped and congured using Amazons SQS (Simple Queue Service), which is a
purpose-built service for message queues fully managed by Amazon and works
awlessly between dierent distributed applications and microservices. Ama-
zons SQS has elastic capabilities that allow the queues to dynamically scale
up or down based on the systems overall requirement. The client-server archi-
tecture of the system requires a platform, which guarantees message delivery
between client and server without any delay, it also requires a platform that
manages and delivers the messages based on the server availability to avoid
message loss. Additionally, the system also requires identifying each message
and avoid any message replication. All these requirements are fullled by SQS
along with full-scale management by service provider to eliminate the expensive
overhead of dealing with message-oriented middleware and its hosting.
3.2. Detection Engine
As presented in gure 5, the requests sent by the client are forwarded to the
detection engine by the queues. The detection engine runs all the techniques
and algorithms that are later discussed, there are multiple detection engines
that are hosted on Amazons EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud). Amazons EC2 pro-
vides computing facility in the cloud with elastic behavior, which is available as
a webservice. Detection engine requires a hosting mechanism which is dynami-
cally scalable and extremely reliable when it comes to cater the client requests.
It also requires itself to be replicated if the number of clients and number of
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requests signicantly increase without causing any delay to other clients and
requests already in process. Moreover, detection engine is required to connect
with other modules included in the system which are designed to be distributed.
Amazons EC2 fullls all the hosting requirements of the detection engine quite
eciently and doesnt require to be managed in contract with other available
options, such as; dedicated external server or an inhouse server.
3.3. Repositories
The two repositories shown in the architectural diagram; repository and
analysis repository that store les to be analyzed (both clean and malicious)
and analysis reports respectively are also part of the server module. Like other
server modules, both repositories are also required to be distributed and scal-
able. The repository stores both clean and malicious les, which are used to
train and test the algorithms that are discussed in the later sections. The num-
ber of les in this repository vary from time to time and the ideal situation will
be if the hosting mechanism can scale itself up and down based on the number
of les and the number of analysis reports stored in it. Amazons EFS (Elastic
File System) allows dynamic scalability along with an ease of connectivity with
other distributed applications and service interfaces. Amazon EFS awlessly
connects with EC2 allowing the applications hosted on EC2 to be integrated
with the lesystem in a larger distributed environment ensuring highest level of
reliability at all times.
To protect the client from a malware attack, there is cloud-assisted lightweight
agent installed on the client system, as proposed, implemented, and tested by
[10]. This lightweight agent can detect malware to a certain extent by inheriting
some of the intelligence from the cloud detection engine. When the client-based
agent detects a le, it sends the le to the cloud engine and simultaneously
checks for legitimacy of the tested le, if the client-based agent can classify it as
malicious then it blocks the le and send the report to the cloud-based detection
engine, if the client-based agent is not able to identify it as malicious then the
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detection engine sends the response based on a detailed yet rapid analysis. Usu-
ally, the cloud-based detection engine doesnt need to analyze the le in detail
because of its rich algorithm and if there is a need for the analysis, it is done
without any extra time. The architectural diagram shows a blue dotted line
coming out of the detection engine and going to the client through the analysis
repository, which shows that if a request comes from a client the detection en-
gine rst checks if that specic le or its variant is analyzed earlier by checking
in the analysis repository. If it exist in the repository, then a response action is
sent back to the client, which makes the overall process much ecient.
4. Data Collection
As stated earlier, the data for this research consisted of 150000 malicious les
and 87000 benign executables of Windows PE format. The benign executables
were retrieved from fresh installation of Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 10,
Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2012. The malicious les present
in the malware repository were obtained from our industrial partner Nettitude,
which was a combination of dierent malware types as presented in table 2.
The les, both benign and malicious, present in their respective repositories
Malware Type Percentage
Trojan 65.82%
Adware 22.67%
Worm 8.66%
Downloader 1.21%
Virus 0.56%
Dropper 0.41%
Exploit 0.39%
Spyware 0.28%
Table 2: Malware Distribution in the Repository
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were used to train and test the algorithms.
The distribution of both type of les is presented in table 3. Apart from
the les in the repositories, the client-based agent captures les in real-time,
which are only used to check for legitimacy and then stored in the respective
repository. The les retrieved through the client-based agent are either captured
through the browser extension or through process logs [10]. Either ways, these
les also become part of the main repository.
File Type Quantity
Benign 87000
Malicious 150000
Table 3: Distribution of Benign and Malicious Files
To extract relevant features, we developed a python-based tool that comprehen-
sively analysis the le and generates a rich set of features. We incorporated our
automated tool with another open source tool PEframe [19], which enhanced the
overall functionality of the tool and personalized it to be awlessly integrated
with our cloud-based system. The system automatically generates JSON-based
les after statically analyzing a malicious or benign le and each JSON le con-
tains a rich set of decisive features, which are then used to training, testing,
and detection purpose. The set of features generated by our tool, unlike our ini-
tial research [10], integrates the results of multiple antiviruses by incorporating
private API of VirusTotal [20]. The use of VirusTotal API not only makes the
JSON les richer, it also endorses some of the analysis results from our tool.
Figure 6 presents the features that are extracted by the analysis tool from every
le it analyzes, it also presents the format in which the JSON le is populated
with all the extracted features. The set of features in gure 6 start with the
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Figure 6: Feature Extraction (without values) and JSON Format
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basic and most important feature of any le i.e. the hash. Our analysis tool
extracts three hashes; SHA256, SHA1, and MD5, which are presented as three
dierent elements of one set. The analysis tool also extracts the libraries used
by the analyzed le, type of le, and any other les that are linked with the
analyzed le. One of the most interesting things extracted by our analysis tool
IP addresses that the said le is trying to access, which helps to determine if the
le is trying to access any malicious IP address. Moreover, critical details in-
cluding API calls, and URL calls are also extracted, which signicantly enhance
the understanding of the legitimacy of the le based on its calls to malicious
or non-malicious external calls. Additionally, to get an external endorsement
from 57 antiviruses, our tool incorporates the private API of VirusTotal.com
and returns the decision based on the outcome of 57 antiviruses, which is later
used in the process of decision making.
Along with the conventional signatures used by antiviruses, our tool generates
some useful features which can make the detection more ecient for the system.
The packer used by the malware author to pack the le is also extracted as a
feature to identify the legitimacy of the le, as proposed and implemented by
[15], pattern recognition can be applied to identify an entire family of malicious
les by identifying the packers. We used a slight dierent technique by identify-
ing the major classes of packers and how they are used to create variants of old
malware by applying machine learning. The rich set of features or attributes
present in a JSON le are used to train and test the algorithm. The most
important part of the whole research is the set features which is used for train-
ing, testing, and detection. We nalized the most relevant and pivotal features,
which make the system more ecient in identifying the true positives. Some
of the features we extracted have the binary value and some have percentage
or a non-binary value, which makes the decision based on this set more accurate.
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5. Methodology
The approach taken in this research is combination of conventional and
unique methodologies for malware detection. We combine detection techniques
commonly used by antiviruses with state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms
to make the system more robust and decisive against modern malicious attacks.
The features extracted from benign and malicious les form a rich and diverse
set of features, as discussed in the previous section. We used two dierent
machine learning techniques and take full advantage of the rich set of features
acquired through the analysis of malicious or benign les.
In the earlier research [10], we implemented ten antiviruses in a detection mod-
ule and linked it with the static analysis module, both of these modules were in
a serialized manner separately. In this research, we combine both the techniques
and created one module that consumes lesser energy and generates a signicant
number of eloquent features and that too in a coherent format.
5.1. Classication Methodology
As mentioned earlier, apart from the conventional detection techniques, we
adopted two dierent techniques from machine learning. We used the rened
features extracted from the PE les to create training samples by considering
each feature or attribute as Boolean, which is either exist True or not False.
We initially selected a small sample of malicious and benign les and applied
the following learning techniques, which we implemented in MATLAB; SVM
(Support Vector Machines), decision trees, we then applied boosting decision
tree. The objective of our methodology is to detect malicious les, therefore,
we refer to malicious les as positives class and benign as negatives class. The
learning techniques mentioned above are discussed in the following sections.
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5.1.1. SVM (Support Vector Machine)
Support vector machines, is a training algorithm which presents a decision
boundary by maximizing the margin amongst training patters. The algorithm
presented by [22], has performed in an optimal fashion in many conventional sce-
narios, along with some studies similar to ours [13, 14, 17]. SVM creates a linear
classier, therefore, vector of weight ~w is its concept description and a threshold
or an intercept, b. To make the problem linearly separable, a kernel function is
used by the SVMs for mapping training data into a higher-dimensioned space.
To set ~w and b that hyperplanes margin is ideal, quadratic programming is
used, which means that distance to the closest examples of negative and posi-
tive classes is maximum from the hyperplane. While running, if h~w:~xi   b > 0,
positive class is predicted and if vice versa negative class is selected by the
method. However, for larger set of problems, quadratic programming can be
complex and expensive, whereas, to train SVM eciently, SMO (Sequential
Minimal Optimization) is a much better algorithm [22], it computes the proba-
bility of positive and negative class during execution [23]. For performance, we
used implementation proposed in [23] for computing each classs probability and
then we used positive classs probability as the rating. We used the following
linear SVM formula to predict the positive classes:
t(x) =
NX
n=1
!nK(x; xn) + !0 (2)
5.1.2. Decision Tree
A decision tree is decision support mechanism with nodes that represent
attributes and the leaf nodes that represent the class labels. Branches of the
tree that lead to children represent the values of the attribute. Values of the at-
tributes and those attributes of an instance are used by the performance element
to navigate in a tree starting from root and leading to leaves or an individual
leaf. By choosing the attribute that perfectly separates the training samples
into their appropriate classes, this is how a learning element generates a tree.
Node, branches, and children are created for the attribute and the value of the
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attribute, the attribute is then eliminated from additional consideration, and
the examples are distributed to the relevant child node. This process runs in
a loop until the same class examples are stored in a node and then class label
is stored. Many implementation of decision trees remove subtrees which are
expected to perform inaccurately on test samples, which avoids the overtraining
of the whole algorithm. We have used MATLAB decision tree implementation
for training and testing.
5.1.3. Boosting
Boosting is used for combining multiple classiers to enhance the perfor-
mance as compare to individual classiers [24]. It uses ensemble methods,
which signicantly increase the overall performance, which has been tested and
endorsed by many studies [25, 26, 27, 28]. By repetitively learning from a
weighted dataset of a model, it creates a set of weighted models by assessing,
and revising the dataset based on the performance of the model. During execu-
tion of the method, to predict the highest weight class, it uses a set of models
and their weights. We only applied boosting on decision tree implementation,
as our initial experiments didnt show any signicance of applying boosting on
SVM. We used AdaBoost.M1 algorithms [24] implementation in MATLAB to
boost decision tree.
5.2. Methodology Design
The machine learning techniques discussed in the previous section are in-
corporated with the analysis and feature extraction techniques to develop a
comprehensive methodology, which can eciently and accurately identify the
malicious les. Figure 7 illustrates the complete methodology that is used for
malware detection, this complete system is hosted on the cloud-based system
discussed earlier and illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Proposed Methodology
We initially had benign and malicious les stored separately in the cloud reposi-
tory, before applying any classication methodology every le has to go through
the analysis module. The customized analysis module developed in this research
rst prepares the le by eliminating any apparent obfuscation, it is then thor-
oughly analyzed and all the possible features are extracted from the le. One
of the signicant features of the proposed methodology is that it is extremely
eective on modern malware, which have the ability to mutate themselves while
propagating in a network, which is mainly achieved by eliminating obfuscated
parts from the extracted features and arrange the features in a format that is
understandable by the classication module. Figure 8 presents the obfuscated
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part removed from the extracted features to make the features understandable
for further classication.
The output of the analysis module is stored in the analysis repository. To per-
form the experiments we put all our benign and malicious les in the respective
parts of the repository and our automated analysis tool extracted the features
and stored the well-formatted features in the analysis repository. To initiate the
classication experiments, the classication module pulled the features from the
repository to apply the above mentioned machine learning techniques.
Figure 8: Obfuscated Part of the Extracted Features
The methodology diagram illustrates that to produce a nal verdict, the pro-
cess went through ten-fold cross-validation to train and test the algorithms to
evaluate the performance of the methodology and later based on this training
it can detect individual malicious les while running in real-time.
6. Malware Detection Experiments
Previous sections present the details of architecture and methodology of the
approach we have proposed in this research. In this section, we present the
observations of multiple experiments performed to evaluate the methodology
proposed. We performed four dierent experiments on a standard experimental
design to help us evaluate the methodology from dierent aspects. In our rst
experiments, we used a smaller dataset of both benign and malicious executables
and applied all the classication techniques. In the second experiments, we used
a larger dataset to apply the classication techniques to monitor the enhance-
ment in the detection rate. In the third experiment, we introduced obfuscated
malicious les that are previously unknown and make the overall dataset much
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larger, which allowed us to observe the performance of the classication tech-
niques against a much dicult dataset. The fourth experiment was performed
on real-time data where we left the system running for more than two months.
6.1. Experimental Design
We have used stratied ten-fold cross-validation to evaluate the methodolo-
gies we are using. This is applied by distributing the les randomly into ten
separate sets of same size. One set is selected for testing and the remaining
nine sets are combined together to create a training set. We applied ten-fold
cross-validation by conducting ten similar executions by using each of the ten
partition as a testing set in each iteration. In each iteration, relevant features,
discussed in the earlier section, were extracted from the training set and the
classication techniques were applied on it. The outcome of the classication
was used identify the les in the test set.
For the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) analysis [26, 27] and to im-
plement the ten-fold- cross-validation, we extracted the features through our
analysis tool and imported in our machine learning build integrated with the
MATLAB ROC code.
6.2. Experiment with Smaller Dataset
After extracting the features, all the parameters required to perform the
experiments were achieved. We separated a set of 500 les from each category
to conduct the initial experiment by starting with ten-fold cross-validation and
then proposed classication techniques. The ROC curves of this experiment is
presented in gure 8 and the areas under curves are presented in table 4. It can
be observed from the table that applying boosting on Decision Tree enhance
the outcome.
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Figure 9: ROC Curves for Malware Classication from a Small Dataset
Method AUC
Decision Tree 0.9708
SVM 0.9727
Boosting 0.9747
Table 4: Results of Applying Classication Techniques on Extracted Features of Smaller
Dataset
The experiment performed on the small sample of clean and malicious les
gave a satisfactory output considering the learning samples were just 500, which
shows that the classication techniques proposed in this research have the po-
tential to perform much better if they are well trained with higher number of
samples.
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Figure 10: ROC Curves for Malware Classication from a Large Dataset
Method AUC
Decision Tree 0.9775
SVM 0.9896
Boosting 0.9969
Table 5: Results of Applying Classication Techniques on Extracted Features of Large Dataset
Figure 11: ROC Curves for Malware Classication from a Obfuscated Dataset
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Method AUC
Decision Tree 0.9740
SVM 0.9823
Boosting 0.9910
Table 6: Results of Applying Classication Techniques on Extracted Features of Obfuscated
Dataset
Figure 12: ROC Curves for Malware Classication from a Real-Time Detection
Method AUC
Decision Tree 0.9765
SVM 0.9892
Boosting 0.9963
Table 7: Results of Applying Classication Techniques on Extracted Features from Real-Time
Detection
7. Discussion
We performed four dierent experiments to evaluate our methodology and
system architecture. The results presented in the previous section prove that
the classication methodology proposed in this research prove the initial hy-
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Figure 13: Performance Evaluation of Lightweight Client Agent
pothesis of enhanced accuracy in malware identication. The initial experiment
tested the methodology with a smaller dataset to understand the eectiveness
of the methodology. The results achieved from the experiments performed on
the smaller dataset were quite satisfactory, as presented in gure 9 and table
4, but not better than the similar experiments performed by [12, 13], which
achieved a better AUC as compare our approach. However, the reason our ini-
tial experiment lack the higher AUC was the feature set selected for training and
testing, which required more testing. This was proved in the second experiment
performed on a large dataset. The results of second experiment presented in g-
ure 10 and table 5 show remarkable improvement over the previous experiment
and also comparing to [13, 14]. SVM achieved a better rate than decision tree
but the implementation of boosting on decision tree signicantly enhanced the
performance by producing a much higher detection rate. As discussed earlier,
boosting can enhance the performance of unstable classiers by decreasing their
variance and bias but it can work inversely on stable classiers [24], which is
why we only applied boosting on decision tree and not on SVM.
Our experimental results prove that CloudIntells methodology can scale in per-
formance on a larger set of les. The training and testing performed on larger
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dataset was extremely rigorous because of the feature set and techniques used,
which also proved that modern obfuscated malware can also be identied with
accuracy, as illustrated in gure 11 and table 6, presenting the result of apply-
ing techniques on obfuscated dataset. Evaluating classication methodologies
based on machine learning against obfuscated and mutated dataset has not been
performed by [13] and many studies [16, 15, 30, 31, 32]. This also shows the
versatility of our approach that can be applied on multiple security threats and
can identify not just known but it can also predict unknown threats.
To evaluate the methodology against live threats, we left the entire system run-
ning for more than two months. There were two objectives behind this experi-
ment; one was to evaluate the system accuracy to detect live threats, second was
to evaluate the energy eciency of the lightweight local agent. The proposed
methodology showed extremely good results outperforming [13] in their similar
experiments of real-time detection of malware. The lightweight host agent also
performed extremely well. Figure 13 presents the evaluation of the lightweight
client agent. The evaluation process of this client agent involved ten cycles of
malware detection and each cycle included 15000 les. The evaluation was per-
formed on every cycle, which means that after every 15000 les scanned by the
client agent we gathered the information about the number of les that were
locally detected as malicious and the percentage of CPU resources used in that
cycle. As illustrated in gure 13, in initial cycles the local detection rate is zero,
which means that the client agent is unable to detect malicious les locally and
detection engine supporting the detection mechanism and at the same time the
client agent is importing the local cache from the cloud-based detection engine
to enhance the local detection. Therefore, after three cycles the local detection
starts to rise and simultaneously the CPU resource consumption of the client
agent starts to go down and it can be seen at the tenth cycle, 60% of 15000 les
are detected locally and the CPU resource consumption dropped to 3% only.
Moreover, the detection rate of our proposed methodology is better in many
dierent than related work as discussed in this section but we were unable to
compare the systems overall performance results with any previously available
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study. We were unable to nd any study that combines dierent machine learn-
ing algorithms and deploy a comprehensive distributed architecture based on
cloud to enhance the detection and reduce the client's CPU consumption.
The architecture of CloudIntell presented in gure 5 is capable of managing a
large number of requests coming from multiple individual clients and enterprise
networks. However, we didnt test the cloud-based architecture against a large
number of clients or against a big network. The test we performed showed
scalability but the scalability of the architecture is yet to be tested. Neverthe-
less, the experimental results do suggest that the system has real-life industrial
application and can signicantly enhance the detection mechanism with every
iteration.
System architecture, methodology, and their performance have been discussed
using dierent aspects, such as; detection rate of algorithms both individual and
combine, detection rate of lightweight client agent using ten cycles, and CPU
resource consumption of lightweight client agent during the evaluation cycles.
Another aspect of evaluating the whole system would be performance evaluation
on a local system instead of cloud. We didnt perform the overall system perfor-
mance evaluation locally but without even testing we can consider some basic
dierences amongst the two approaches; 1) system requires dedicated storage
of more than 300GB to work as a repository, 2) Detection engine requires at
least 4 GB of RAM to run the combination of algorithm and the static analysis
tool, 3) Detection engine also require dedicated bandwidth to interact with the
external APIs for decision endorsements. Although, the cloud-based detection
engine and other module dont always require the above-mentioned resources
and rarely reach this threshold of resources but when required these resources
should be available for the cloud-based module to execute its tasks. Therefore,
the scalability feature of cloud benets the discussed architecture by dynami-
cally scaling up and down based on the requirements of the system and helps
to avoid any unnecessary costs.
31
8. Concluding Remarks
Using machine learning techniques to identify malicious activity in a system
or in a network have proved to be quite eective [16, 15, 30, 31, 32]. We focused
on two main issues in domain of malware detection; a) accurately identifying
a malware, and b) enhance energy eciency of the detection mechanism. The
methodology of CloudIntell used machine learning techniques to enhance the
malware detection rate and a cloud-based architecture to support and host the
methodology implementation. We used decision trees, SVM, and then applied
boosting on decision trees to improve the performance of weak classiers. We
developed an automated feature extracting tool, which extracted the features
from more than 200,000 les quite eciently. The feature extraction tool also
have the functionality of removing the obfuscated parts of the malicious le,
which allows the relevant features to be extracted appropriately to apply the
machine learning methodologies.
We designed multiple experiment to test our proposed methodology from dier-
ent perspectives. We tested our techniques against a dataset of malicious and
clean les and applied ten-fold cross-validation followed by above mentioned
machine learning techniques for an unbiased set of experimental results. We
used around 150000 malicious and 87000 benign les for training and testing.
Support Vector Machine performed better than decision tree but applying boost-
ing on decision tree improved the performance by generating the best detector
of 0.9969 area under the ROC curve. To evaluate the methodology against a
much dicult dataset, we used a dataset of obfuscated malware, which used the
training of previous experiment to detect the obfuscated malware. Boosting on
decision tree generated 0.9910 area under the ROC curve. This not only proved
the better performance against dicult dataset, it also suggest that previous
training was enough to detect a dierent set of malware. We also evaluated the
system with real-time data and generated 0.9963 area under the ROC curve.
We also tested our host based agent in the real-time experiment and observed an
optimum level of energy eciency and unsupervised malware detection ability
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with the help of local cache. However, we were unable to test the CloudIntells
architectural design against multiple clients or enterprise network, which we plan
to do in future. We plan to enhance the lightweight local agent to work in an
enterprise environment and then evaluate the cloud-based architecture against
large number of request. This will also evaluate the performance of the host
agent along with the detection mechanism in a distributed and heterogeneous
environment of an enterprise.
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